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Ties Matter: Improving Eciency in Course Allocation
by Introducing Ties
By Ning Chen and Mengling Li
We study the course allocation system at Nanyang Technological
University, where students submit strict preferences for courses
and courses have implicit preferences for students. This formulates
a many-to-many matching problem. We show the ineciencies of
the current mechanism and propose new competing mechanisms
called Pareto-improving draft and dictatorship mechanisms, which
introduce ties into students' preferences. Our mechanisms gen-
erate (group) stable and Pareto-ecient allocations, and the dic-
tatorship mechanism can be implemented truthfully. Simulations
on real data show that introducing ties into students' preferences
can signicantly improve eciency, and the draft mechanism out-
performs the dictatorship mechanism despite that the former is
non-strategyproof.
JEL: C78, D82, I23
Course allocation is a classic many-to-many matching problem in which a set
of courses are allocated to a set of students who have multiunit course demands.
Allocating courses equitably and eciently has proven a challenging market de-
sign problem and there has been little in the literature to address it due to a
variety of diculties. First, students do not have proprietary rights over courses;
therefore, buying or selling courses through money transfer is strictly prohibited.
Second, the use of an unauthorized computer program to gain unfair advantage
over other students in securing courses is unacceptable. Third, students may have
preferences not only for individual courses but also for combinations of courses,
and these preferences may include ties (i.e., indierences); thus, they may exhibit
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complicated strategic behavior. Finally, because most applications involve a large
number of students and courses under a strict deadline to produce a feasible al-
location, an ecient computation is critical. Consequently, the course allocation
problem and the more general many-to-many matching problems are substantially
more dicult to address than one-to-one and many-to-one allocation problems.1
In practice, there are two main types of course allocation mechanisms employed
in educational institutions.
 Preference-ranking mechanisms, e.g., the draft mechanism at Harvard Business
School (HBS), in which students submit ordinal preferences for courses. Bud-
ish and Cantillon (2012) showed that the draft mechanism is manipulable in
theory and manipulated in practice; but, interestingly, the mechanism outper-
forms the strategyproof alternative, which implies that strategyproofness has
both benets and costs. The authors further proposed a proxy draft mecha-
nism that is shown to generate better eciency. Later, Kominers et al. (2010)
proposed a new proxy mechanism that simplies students' strategic decision
by directly incorporating their manipulation strategy into the mechanism. The
mechanism is Pareto-ecient and resistant to strategic manipulations observed
in the extant data. However, other unobserved manipulations may still exist.
 Bidding mechanisms, e.g., the mechanism at the Ross School of Business at
the University of Michigan (UMBS), in which students bid for courses. In the
UMBS mechanism, bids submitted by students play a dual role|to infer the
preferences of both students and courses. These two roles can easily conict
and result in unnecessary eciency loss. Sonmez and Unver (2010) proposed
an alternative Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant mechanism that asks students
to submit their preferences for courses in addition to bids. The mechanism
is conrmed to have superior eciency in both eld and laboratory studies
by Krishna and Unver (2008). However, the mechanism is not strategyproof,
which can prompt additional concerns about eciency loss.
1The generalization to multiunit demand on both sides is nontrivial as the properties and structures
of many-to-many matchings behave rather dierently from one-to-one and many-to-one matchings (Roth
and Sotomayor 1990, Sotomayor 1999, Echenique and Oviedo 2006). Further, the presence of a few many-
to-many demands may change the matching for all agents completely (see Example 2.2 in Echenique and
Oviedo (2006)). There have been a growing number of instances of many-to-many matching markets
in recent years, such as social lending markets (Chen and Ghosh 2011) and online labor markets. It is
therefore important to study the general many-to-many matching models to understand these market-
places.
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Note that while the common objectives of course allocation mechanisms are e-
ciency and equity, the practice of using dierent mechanisms in dierent educa-
tional institutions indicates that the current mechanisms are neither well under-
stood nor satisfactory.
In this paper, we examine the course allocation system for around 13,000 un-
dergraduate students at Nanyang Technology University (NTU) in Singapore and
explore its potential improvement. In NTU's current mechanism, students submit
strict preferences for individual courses in dierent categories and courses have
predetermined preferences (with ties) for students, which are essentially the pri-
orities of each student. A centralized mechanism then determines allocations by
considering student-course pairs in an order based on the priorities of students and
their course preferences. This is a preference-ranking mechanism and is similar to
the Boston Student Assignment Mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 2003).
The details of the mechanism are deferred to the subsequent section.
The NTU's mechanism does exhibit some nice properties. An allocation gen-
erated through this mechanism is both pairwise stable (i.e., there is no student-
course blocking pair) and students-sided group stable (i.e., there is no group of
students such that each of them can strictly improve his/her assignment by swap-
ping courses among themselves). Note that the latter is a simple implication of
the strict preferences of students and a homogeneity property exhibited by the
students' priorities. However, the mechanism is not strategyproof in theory and
is manipulated in practice.2 Furthermore, breaking ties arbitrarily at random
(as courses' preferences for students have ties) may result in severe eciency
loss. A similar issue was recently addressed for many-to-one matchings (Erdil
and Ergin 2006, Erdil and Ergin 2008, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2009).
A critical ingredient in NTU's mechanism is that students are enforced to sub-
mit strict preferences. Indeed, much of the literature on many-to-many matching
markets assumes strict preferences when studying solution concepts.3 In prac-
2As shown in a eld survey of over 1,200 students at NTU (see Figure 1), 19 percent indicate that
they would manipulate their preferences.
3Roth (1984) showed that the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty with substitutable pref-
erences, and that one-sided optimal stable matchings exist. Blair (1988) proved that the set of pair-
wise stable matchings forms a lattice structure; its properties have been investigated by Alkan (2001)
and Alkan (2002). Martnez et al. (2004) presented an algorithm that nds all pairwise stable matchings.
A pairwise stable matching, however, need not be group stable and need not even be Pareto-optimal
with responsive preferences (Roth and Sotomayor 1990). Further, Sotomayor (2011) presented examples
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tice, however, there are various matching markets in which agents are not able to
strictly rank their prospective partners for a variety of reasons (e.g., incomplete
information). Our survey data (see Figure 1) show that in the course allocation
at NTU, 76 percent of students prefer to have ties in their preference lists. This
motivates us to design a course allocation mechanism for many-to-many matching
markets that includes ties in both courses' and students' preferences, in the hope
of satisfying more students' demand and increasing overall eciency.
Before designing our mechanism, we examine which solutions are desired in
course allocation. On the one hand, we still hope to keep pairwise and student-
sided stability to capture fairness by taking students' preferences and priorities
into account. On the other hand, we require that the allocation be Pareto-
ecient, which to some extent qualies the overall eciency of an allocation.
Pairwise stability and Pareto eciency (together called Pareto stability as sug-
gested by Sotomayor (2011)), provide a natural solution benchmark for matching
markets in the presence of ties. Note that Pareto stability and one-sided group
stability generally cannot coexist (Claim 1). However, in our application, with the
homogeneity property of the students' priorities, we show that Pareto stability
implies one-sided group stability (Proposition 2).
The question then becomes whether a Pareto-stable matching always exists, and
how to nd one eciently. Introducing ties into preferences results in dramatic
changes to the properties of stable matchings. In particular, stability no longer
guarantees Pareto eciency.4 The question of nding a Pareto-stable matching
has recently been addressed by Erdil and Ergin (2006, 2008) for many-to-one
matchings. They presented a stability-preserving Pareto-improving algorithm
by eliminating augmenting paths/cycles. However, their algorithm fails to work
for many-to-many matchings, in which Pareto improvement does not necessarily
preserve stability (see Example 5).
We construct an ecient algorithm that computes a Pareto-stable many-to-
many matching. Our result immediately implies the existence of such a match-
in which the set of group stable matchings is empty. Echenique and Oviedo (2006) later gave conditions
under which the group stable matchings set is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm.
4For example, there are two men m1;m2 and two women w1; w2, where m1 strictly prefers w1 to w2,
but all others are indierent amongst their possible partners. The matching (m1; w2); (m2; w1) is stable,
but not Pareto-ecient because m1 can be reassigned to w1 and m2 to w2 without negative eect.
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ing. Our algorithm works for general arbitrary preferences for individuals in the
presence of ties. The algorithm, from a high-level overview, builds on the idea
of Roth and Vande Vate (1990), who provided an alternative to the deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm that computes a stable (one-to-one) matching. The details of
the algorithm are presented in Section IV.
Our algorithm, like those of Erdil and Ergin (2006, 2008), is a Pareto-stable
matching mechanism, which is generally not strategyproof (see Example 2 of Erdil
and Ergin (2008)). In the course allocation applications, we construct two addi-
tional competing allocation mechanisms: the Pareto-improving draft mechanism
and the Pareto-improving serial dictatorship mechanism, based on the homogene-
ity of students' priorities. Both mechanisms compute a Pareto-stable matching
and the latter can be implemented in a truthful manner, which makes it a dom-
inant strategy for students to report their true preferences. This signicantly
simplies the strategic consideration of students. The truthful mechanism is
based on the combination of the random serial dictatorship mechanism and aug-
menting paths/cycles elimination. While the dictatorship mechanism exhibits the
property of strategyproofness, it brings out some potential fairness issues by giv-
ing too much priority to the lucky students who get a high random order while
callously disregarding the preferences of those who belong to the same priority
group but receive a low random order. Therefore, with some simple welfare mea-
sures, including the average rank of assigned courses and the total number of
unassigned students, we compare the performance of the Pareto-improving draft
and dictatorship mechanisms using real course registration data.
To quantify eciency improvement that allows ties in students' preferences and
compare the two competing allocation mechanisms, simulations are performed us-
ing real course registration data from three academic years at NTU: 2010, 2011
and 2012 at NTU. A survey has revealed that a majority of students prefer to
have two or three levels of preference. Given the strict preferences submitted by
students, we therefore divide the students' preferences into two or three levels
at random and assume that students are indierent between courses at the same
level. We run simulations in dierent environments introducing ties and for dif-
ferent categories of courses using the draft and dictatorship mechanisms. The
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simulation results show that (1) the eciency in terms of total number of alloca-
tions and total number of unassigned students can be signicantly improved by
introducing ties into students' preferences; (2) the draft mechanism outperforms
the dictatorship mechanism in terms of the total number of allocations, the av-
erage rank and the total number of unassigned students, even though it is not
strategyproof.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I
describes NTU's current course allocation system and mechanism. Section II for-
mally denes the many-to-many matching model with ties. Section III discusses
the solution concepts considered in this paper. The algorithm that computes a
Pareto-stable matching in general frameworks and two specic mechanisms for
the course allocation problem are described in Section IV. The simulation results
and discussions are presented in Section V. We conclude our work in Section VI.
I. NTU Course Allocation: Matching with Preferences
In course allocation, while it is natural to assume that students have preferences
for courses, educational institutes usually decide a priority ranking for individual
students for each course. For instance, a course may take prior considerations for
nal year graduating students who need the course to fulll graduation require-
ments, or those who failed the course in the preceding semesters and need to take
the course again in the current semester. The priority ranking can be considered
a course's implicit preference for students.
The current course allocation system at NTU solicits preferences from both
students and courses to decide allocations. Specically, in addition to the major
core courses required by each department, there are two types of general education
requirements that are open to students from all departments: Prescribed Electives
(PE) and Unrestricted Electives (UE).5 Students submit up to ve courses under
a strict order as preferences for both PE and UE, respectively, to the system.
The implicit preferences of courses for individual students (i.e., their priorities)
are formed according to the following hierarchy (from highest to lowest):
5The detailed description of the curriculum structure of NTU is deferred to Appendix A.
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1)  Students with only PE courses remaining to fulll, if the course is a
PE type.
 Students with only UE courses remaining to fulll, if the course is a
UE type.
 Students with only PE or UE courses remaining to fulll, if the course
is both a PE and UE type.
2) Final year students.
3) Students of special programs (e.g., accelerated bachelor degree).
4) Year 3 students.
5) Year 2 students.
Note that some of the students are at the same level on the priority lists; that is,
there are ties (i.e., indierences) in the courses' preference lists. In addition, it
can be seen that all of the courses have the same preferences for students (called
homogeneous). In particular, all of the courses (PE or UE) can list all those
students who have only PE or UE courses to fulll in the rst priority. (This is
because a student with only PE/UE courses to fulll will not submit any UE/PE
courses, respectively. The individual rationality property of feasible assignments
allows us to unify the preferences of courses in such a way.)
PROPOSITION 1: The preferences of courses for students are homogeneous.6
Each course has a prespecied capacity constraint due to resource limitations,
e.g., the size of a classroom. In addition, every student has a capacity constraint
as well, which sets an upper bound on the number of registered courses allowed.
Specically, except for nal year graduating students, a student will be allocated,
at most, one course for PE and one course for UE. In addition, for all students
(including those in their nal year), a maximum of 24 academic units (including
major core courses) can be registered within one semester, which corresponds to
about 7 courses.
Given the capacity constraints and preferences of both students and courses,
the system allocates the courses to the students using a mechanism, which runs
6Precisely, some courses may have special predetermined preferences for students (e.g., the course
Economics of Manufacturing takes prior consideration of students majoring in Material Sciences and
Engineering). In such cases, some vacancies are reserved in advance by the corresponding departments,
and the preferences of courses are still homogeneous in the system.
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for PE and UE courses separately and sequentially, rst for PE, followed by UE.
(If a course is in both PE and UE, its capacity will be predivided for PE and UE,
respectively, by the administration.) The mechanism is described as follows.
NTU mechanism
Consider students priority by priority. For all students that are at the same
priority level, consider courses according to their preferences. That is, for
k = 1; : : : ; 5,
 Consider all student-course pairs in which the student is at the considered
priority level and the course is as his/her k-th choice, and assign courses
to students amongst these pairs subject to the capacity constraints (with ties
broken randomly).
The mechanism is simple to implement and quite similar to the Boston Student
Assignment Mechanism as described by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003). The
main dierence is that the Boston Student Assignment Mechanism runs simul-
taneously for all students instead of running separately for students in dierent
priority groups. A serious shortcoming of the Boston Student Assignment Mech-
anism is that students with high priorities at specic schools lose their priorities
unless they list these schools as their top choices. As a consequence, truth-telling
is not a dominant strategy and students can easily manipulate their preferences.
Indeed, in a recent eld survey (see Figure 1) of NTU's current course allocation
system, from a pool of over 1,200 participating students, 19 percent indicated that
they did not place course preferences truthfully. Manipulation is a key challenge
to the mechanism, and may result in severe eciency loss.
A. Ineciency of the Mechanism
While the NTU mechanism guarantees fairness to some extent by considering
the preferences of students and courses, there are a large number of students who
are not assigned any course due to competitiveness and the mechanism, which
results in considerable eciency loss (see Table 1 for the data summary of course
allocation statistics for the three academic years: 2010, 2011 and 2012). Note that
the allocation statistics were collected after certain manual adjustments, which
have already corrected some of the ineciency issues in the results directly from
the mechanism. Inecient course allocations result in appeals and complaints
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Table 1|Course Registration Statistics for Semester 1 of Academic Year 2010-2012.
Course Vacancies Students Allocations Percentage
PE 8,118 9,660 6,844 84.31
2010 UE 14,178 10,672 8,366 59.01
PE+UE 22,296 13,471 15,210 68.22
PE 10,092 8,546 6,919 68.56
2011 UE 15,342 8,836 9,128 59.50
PE+UE 25,434 11,321 16,047 63.09
PE 9,305 8,157 6,729 72.32
2012 UE 16,260 8,731 7,170 44.10
PE+UE 25,565 11,541 13,899 54.37
Percentage is measured as the total number of allocations over the total vacancies. For
instance, for the 2010 data, the PEs and UEs have 8,118 and 14,178 vacancies while
9,660 and 10,672 students demand them, respectively. The data indicate that the current
systems resulted in an allocation of 6,844 PEs and 8,366 UEs. About 29.15 percent and
21.61 percent of the students who requested PEs and UEs failed to get any allocation,
respectively. Note that in the 2011 data, the number of UE allocations is larger than that
of students, because a considerable amount of students get more than one UE registered
in the process of manual adjustments after the implementation of the mechanism.
submitted by unsatised students, and can even cause the deferral of graduation
for nal year students. Due to the ineciency of the NTU mechanism, many
unsatised students and program coordinators spend a tremendous amount of
time and eort manually seeking better allocations. Despite this eort, some
students can still end up with an unfavorable outcome in which no course is
registered.
Our survey statistics (Figure 1) show that 65 percent of students nd the current
system unsatisfactory. Another important phenomenon illustrated in the survey
is that 76 percent of the students think that they should be allowed to indicate
ties (i.e., indierences) in their course preferences. In practice, while students
may have strict preferences for some courses, such strictness is not very sensitive
in the sense that most students are usually only concerned with whether one
of his/her desired courses is registered, but not exactly which one. In other
words, it is reasonable to assume that students' preferences should have ties. As
a consequence, we consider introducing ties into students' preferences for courses,
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with the objective of reducing the aws in the current system and improving
overall eciency for students.
1) Are you satisfied with the current course allocation system?
 Yes --- 35 percent  No --- 65 percent
2) Are you indifferent between two or more courses that you are interested in
(i.e., among these courses, you do not strictly prefer one to another)?
 Yes --- 76 percent  No --- 24 percent
3) If your answer is "Yes" to the previous question, how many levels would like
to have in your preference structure (assuming you are indifferent between the
courses in the same level)?
 One level (all indifferent) --- 10 percent
 Two levels --- 35 percent
 Three levels --- 23 percent
 Four levels --- 8 percent
4) What is the number of courses you would like to put on your preference list?
 Five --- 75 percent
 Ten --- 13 percent
 Other --- 12 percent
5) Do you submit courses to the system according to your true preferences?
 Yes --- 81 percent  No --- 19 percent
Figure 1. Survey Questions and Results for 1,200 students at NTU.
II. Model
Given the fact that both students and courses have capacities and incomplete
preferences with ties, we consider a two-sided many-to-many matching model with
a set of men M and a set of women W .7 Throughout this paper, we use m 2M
to denote a man, w 2 W to denote a woman and x; y; z 2 M [ W to denote
any individual agent (man or woman). For each agent x 2 M [W , let cx 2 N
be his/her capacity, which is the maximum number of agents on the opposite
side that can be matched to x. The presence of capacities allows us to assume,
without loss of generality, that jM j = jW j = n, as dummy agents with cx = 0 can
be added to the market.
Each man m 2M has a preference list Pm ranking individual women, denoted
7As our model and technical results work for more general settings, we use the terms `men' and
`women', following the seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962), to describe the model. In our applica-
tion, men can represent students and women can represent courses, or vice versa.
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by  and =, where w1  w2 means that m strictly prefers w1 to w2, and w1 = w2
means that m is indierent between them8. We say m weakly prefers w1 to w2
if either w1  w2 or w1 = w2, denoted by w1  w2. Every two women in Pm
are comparable and the preference is assumed to be transitive. The preference
Pm gives a partial list of individual women that are acceptable to m (i.e., m does
not want to be matched with any woman that is not on the list). For example, a
possible preference list for m is Pm : (w1 = w2  w3 = w5). Here, m is indierent
between w1 and w2, prefers either of them to w3 and w5, amongst which m is
indierent, and nds all other women unacceptable. The preference list Pw for
each woman w 2W is dened similarly.9 We use E = f(m;w) j m 2 Pw; w 2 Pmg
to denote the set of mutually acceptable pairs.
Note that the preference lists Pm and Pw as dened above are for individu-
als. Because agents can have capacities greater than one, we also need to dene
preferences for subsets. Considering our motivating application course allocation,
from the viewpoint of courses, they only care about the interests of individual
students and do not necessarily have preferences over subsets of students. (In
particular, the preferences of courses for individual students are according to
the students' need to take the courses, rather than their identities and scores.)
Students in NTU's current system are only allowed to submit preferences for
individual courses. Indeed, with a large number of students and courses, spec-
ifying preferences for subsets results in complicated comparisons of alternatives
and lengthy preference lists, yielding an inapplicable system. In addition, while
students may have preferences for subsets of courses, this mostly occurs among
those with prerequisite relations, which cannot be registered in the same semester.
For example, one must take the course `Microeconomic Principles' before being
allowed to take the course `Industrial Organization'. Within one semester the
main concern of every student is thus individual courses.
Therefore, in our study we assume that preferences are responsive with a lattice
structure. That is, given a subset S  W and two women w;w0 =2 S, m prefers
8Precisely, there is a subscription m in the notations, i.e., m and =m. For simplicity we omit the
subscription when it is clear from the context.
9In the application of course allocation at NTU, students submit two preference lists, one for PE and
one for UE. Here, for simplicity, we assume that each individual has only one preference for the other
side. Our technical results can be easily generalized to the settings in which one has multiple preferences.
Details are provided in Section IV.C.
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S [ fwg to S [ fw0g if and only if m prefers w to w0. (Note that it is allowed
that w or w0 = ;; in particular, m prefers ; to any woman w =2 Pm, prefers any
woman w 2 Pm to ;, and is indierent between any w;w0 =2 Pm.) In other words,
for any two sets that dier in only one woman, m prefers one that contains
the more preferred woman and is indierent between them if he is indierent
between the two women. The preferences of women are dened similarly. In
addition, the responsive preference is transitive, i.e., if m prefers S1 to S2 and
S2 to S3, he also prefers S1 to S3. Note that this preference for subsets only
constitutes a partial order, precisely, a complete distributive lattice. That is, two
alternatives are comparable only if they are an ancestor-descendant relation in the
lattice.10 In Appendix B, we give an example to show responsive preference with
a lattice structure. This model of preferences with multiunit capacity has been
used in, e.g., Erdil and Ergin (2006). It is simple, because agents only need to
express preferences for individuals, and is arguably natural for settings in which
the benet from a partner to an agent does not depend on the agent's remaining
partners.
Given the preferences of all of the agents, our objective is to establish a multiu-
nit pairing between men and women, called an assignment (or a many-to-many
matching). An assignment is denoted by  = (mw)m2M;w2W , where mw = 1
means that m and w are matched and mw = 0 otherwise. A feasible assignment
is one that satises the following conditions:
P
w mw  cm and
P
m mw  cw,
and mw = 1 only if m and w are mutually acceptable. All of the assignments
considered in this paper are feasible. Further, for any x 2M [W , we denote by
(x) the set of individuals matched to x in the assignment .
III. Solution Concepts
Given the many-to-many matching model dened above, the next question is
which assignment is desired. While we cannot satisfy the demands of all students,
we hope to provide a solution that is in favor of most students. In this section,
we examine a number of solution concepts from dierent perspectives in course
allocation.
10Note that the responsive preference dened in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) is a complete ranking for
all compatible subsets, unlike ours, which forms a lattice structure.
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A. Pairwise Stability
In many two-sided matching models, e.g., student placement and school choice
(Sonmez and Unver 2011), one desired property of an allocation is the elimination
of justied envy. That is, whenever a student m prefers the allocation of another
student m0, m should not rank higher than m0 in the priority list of courses.
Consider the following example.
EXAMPLE 1: There are two students m1;m2 and two courses w1; w2 each with
unit capacity. Their preferences are shown on the left-hand side below.
w2
w1
m2
m1
w1 ≻ w2
w1 ≻ w2
m2 ≻ m1
m2 ≻ m1
w2
w1
m2
m1
In the rst allocation, m2 is not assigned to his rst choice w1, which lists him
with a higher priority than m1. In such a case, m2 can simply ask:
\I am more eligible for the course; why was I not assigned?"
Hence, a fairer solution is to allocate w1 to m2 (see the above gure on the right-
hand side). Now m1 is not assigned to his rst choice w1, but he can use the
following reasoning:
\I did not get the course, but all those who got it are (more) eligible."
Equivalently, if a course (i.e., w2) has not been assigned to a student (i.e., m2)
who has a higher priority, then the student should be assigned to another course
that he prefers (more).
The issues illustrated by the example above are captured by stability, a solution
concept rst proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) in the application of marriage
markets and college admission. The formal denition of stability in our many-to-
many matching model is as follows.
DEFINITION 1 (Pairwise stability): We say that a feasible assignment  =
(mw) is (pairwise) stable if there is no mutually accepted pair (m;w) 2 E (called
a blocking pair) with mw = 0, satisfying one of the following conditions:
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 Both m and w have leftover capacity;
 m has leftover capacity and there is m0, m0w = 1, such that w strictly prefers
m to m0; or w has capacity remaining and there is w0, mw0 = 1, such that m
prefers w to w0;
 There are m0 and w0, mw0 = 1 and m0w = 1, such that m strictly prefers w
to w0 and w strictly prefers m to m0.
In course allocation, the stability concept ensures a certain level of fairness
among students in the sense that no blocking pairs can upset the structure of
a matching. It creates a balance in the competition among students and their
priorities in each course.
Note that both members of a blocking pair are able to strictly improve their
assignments respectively by matching with each other (and possibly breaking
some of the current assignments). A stable assignment always exists, and can
be found using a variant of Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale
and Shapley 1962) for computing one-to-one stable matchings (e.g., by making cx
copies for each individual x 2M [W with the same preference list and breaking
ties randomly).
B. Pareto Eciency
Another important criterion in our application is social welfare, which measures
the overall eciency of an allocation. Consider the following two examples.
EXAMPLE 2: There are two students m1;m2 and two courses w1; w2 each with
unit capacity. Their preferences are shown on the left-hand side below.
w2
w1
m2
m1
w1 = w2
w1
m1 = m2
m1 = m2
w2
w1
m2
m1
The rst allocation in which only m2 is assigned to a course w1 is stable. However,
a more ecient allocation is on the right-hand side, where both m1 and m2 are
assigned to a course. Note that the second allocation is also stable.
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EXAMPLE 3: There are two students m1;m2 and two courses w1; w2 each with
unit capacity. Their preferences are shown on the left-hand side below.
w2
w1
m2
m1
w1 = w2
w2 ≻ w1
m1 = m2
m1 = m2
w2
w1
m2
m1
While both of the allocations are stable, the second is more desirable in the sense
that student m1 is assigned to a course he likes more and the assignments of other
individuals remain at the same preference level.
In the two examples above, the second allocation dominates the rst one in
the sense that someone's allocation is strictly improved while no one is worse o.
This property is captured by the notion of Pareto eciency. An allocation that is
not Pareto-ecient implies that certain changes in allocations may result in some
individuals being better o with no individual being worse o, therefore leading
to an eciency improvement. The formal denition is given below.
DEFINITION 2 (Pareto eciency): Given a feasible assignment  = (mw), we
say that 0 = (0mw) is a Pareto improvement of  if for all x 2 M [ W , x
weakly prefers 0(x) to (x), and the preference is strict for at least one agent. An
assignment  is called Pareto-ecient if it does not have any Pareto improvement.
Note that in the original Gale-Shapley stable marriage model with strict pref-
erences, stability implies Pareto eciency (Roth and Sotomayor 1990). However,
when indierences (ties) are allowed, stability no longer guarantees Pareto e-
ciency. Further, even if preferences are strict, in many-to-many matching models
with responsive preferences, a stable matching need not be Pareto-ecient (Roth
and Sotomayor 1990).
This denition is two-sided Pareto eciency, i.e., it considers the social welfare
of both students and courses. Another related notion is one-sided Pareto e-
ciency, i.e., it only considers the social welfare of students. In course allocation
and general many-to-many matchings, both denitions are reasonable and may
nd their applications.11 In the following, we discuss the existence and computa-
11In the course allocation at NTU, the priorities of courses mainly reect students' need to take
the courses; thus, student-sided Pareto eciency may better capture social eciency. However, in the
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tion of solutions with respect to both denitions.
C. Group Stability
The notion of pairwise stability described above captures fairness in terms of a
pair of student and course. However, students may still end up with an unsatis-
fying assignment. Consider the following example.
EXAMPLE 4: There are two students m1;m2 and two courses w1; w2 each with
unit capacity. Their preferences are shown on the left-hand side below.
w2
w1
m2
m1
w1 ≻ w2
w2 ≻ w1
m2 ≻ m1
m1 ≻ m2
w2
w1
m2
m1
The rst allocation is stable and Pareto-ecient. Note that since m1 prefers m2's
assignment and m2 prefers m1's assignment, they can swap courses with each
other, resulting in the second allocation. Although the swapping is not a Pareto
improvement, it improves both students' welfare. Therefore, given that students'
welfare is our main consideration, the second allocation is more desirable.
To capture the issue illustrated by the above example, we dene a property
called (one-sided) group stability: if an assignment is group stable, there is no
group of students such that each of them can be strictly better o through re-
assignment within the group. The formal denition is as follows (recall that M
denotes the set of students).
DEFINITION 3 (Group stability): Given a feasible assignment  = (mw), we
say that  is blocked by a coalition S  M if all members in S are able to get
a strictly better assignment by swapping matchings within S. Formally, consider
the submarket formed by S and W with capacity cw   jfm 2M n S j w 2 (m)gj
for each w 2 W , there is a feasible assignment 0 such that 0(m) m (m) for
all m 2 S. We say an assignment is (one-side) group stable if it is not blocked
by any coalition.
applications where the preferences of courses are set by individual departments or lecturers, two-sided
Pareto eciency might be a better solution concept.
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In the denition above, the capacity of each w 2 W is the remaining capacity
of w for S. If an allocation is group stable, then there is no way for any subset of
students to swap courses to improve everyone's assignment. In other words, there
always exists a student in the coalition whose assignment cannot be improved;
that student then has no incentive to form the coalition and the original allocation
is group stable.
In many-to-one matching, it is well known that group stability is equivalent to
pairwise stability given responsive preferences (Lemma 5.5, Roth and Sotomayor
(1990)). (Note that the notion of group stability dened in Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) considers the improvement of both sides.) However, such equivalence does
not hold for one-sided group stability even in one-to-one matching, as illustrated
by Example 4. Indeed, we can show the following impossibility result.
CLAIM 1: There is an instance in which pairwise stability and one-sided group
stability cannot hold simultaneously even if all individuals have unit capacity.
Note that if a matching is student-sided Pareto-ecient, it is also students-
sided group stable. Thus, the above claim also implies that pairwise stability and
one-sided Pareto eciency cannot coexist in general; this fact is also illustrated
by Example 2.31 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
However, if one side has homogeneous preferences (i.e., all preferences are the
same), as is the case in our course allocation application, the two stability notions
can coexist. (Further, given such a condition, one-sided Pareto eciency implies
two-sided Pareto eciency; see more discussions in Section IV.E.)
PROPOSITION 2: In a many-to-many matching market, if one side has homo-
geneous preferences (i.e., courses), then a pairwise stable and two-sided Pareto-
ecient assignment is group stable for the other side (i.e., students).
D. Incentive Compatibility
Another important issue in determining an allocation is strategic considerations,
i.e., whether it is a dominant strategy for individual agents to report their private
preference truthfully. While it is well known that there is one-sided truthfulness
for one-to-one and many-to-one matching models (Roth and Sotomayor 1990),
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the truthfulness only applies to the side with unit demand, i.e., the \one" side.
Hence, in the general many-to-many matching model, we cannot expect to have
a truthful mechanism that always generates a stable matching.
However, many stable matching mechanisms work quite well in practice even
though theoretically they are not incentive compatible. One theoretical sup-
port for such phenomena is that many markets of interests can be modeled as
large markets. Incentive compatibility in large markets has been studied in,
e.g., exchange economy (Roberts and Postlewaite 1976), double auctions (Cripps
and Swinkels 2006, Fudenberg et al. 2007), and the probabilistic serial mecha-
nism (Kojima and Manea 2010). Most of these studies show either that the gain
from manipulations converges to zero or that an equilibrium behavior converges
to truth-telling. In two-sided matching markets, several studies have analyzed
the incentive compatibility of large markets. Roth and Peranson (1999), Immor-
lica and Mahdian (2005) and Kojima and Pathak (2009) showed that the Gale-
Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm becomes increasingly hard to manipulate
as the number of participants increases.
The application of course allocation usually involves a large amount of students
and courses. Motivated by previous studies on strategic behavior in large markets,
we expect similar results to hold. It would be an interesting future direction to
explore the incentive properties of large many-to-many matching markets.
In the course allocation at NTU, as discussed earlier, the priorities of courses are
homogeneous. Such a property allows us to design an incentive compatible mech-
anism that satises the above solution conditions. The mechanism is presented
in Section IV.E.
In the following discussions, unless specied explicitly, `stability' refers to pair-
wise stability, `group stability' refers to one-sided group stability and `Pareto
eciency' refers to two-sided Pareto eciency. Further, we use the notion Pareto
stability (Sotomayor 2011) to denote matchings that are both two-sided Pareto-
ecient and pairwise stable.
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IV. Pareto-Stable Matching Mechanisms
For many-to-one matching with ties, a Pareto-stable assignment always exists
and can be computed using the algorithm of Erdil and Ergin (2006, 2008). The
algorithm relies on two observations. First, an assignment has a Pareto improve-
ment only if the assignment graph has an augmenting path or cycle (formally
dened in Section IV.A). Second, and more critically, any Pareto improvement
to a stable assignment preserves stability. These observations immediately im-
ply an algorithm to nd a Pareto-stable assignment: starting from any stable
assignment, keep making Pareto improvements by eliminating augmenting paths
and cycles until none remains, and the resulting matching is both stable and
Pareto-ecient.
In a many-to-many matching market, if only one side has ties, the same stability
preserving result still holds.
CLAIM 2: In a many-to-many matching market, if only one side has ties, Pareto
improvement preserves stability.
When both sides of a market have ties, however, we observe that the second
critical property fails. That is, a Pareto improvement to a stable assignment
need not preserve stability even when one side has homogeneous preferences, as
the following example shows.
EXAMPLE 5 (Pareto improvement does not preserve stability): Consider the
example in the following gure, where m2 and w2 have a capacity of two each and
other agents all have unit capacity.
w3
w2
w1
m3
m2
m1
w2
w1 ≻ w2 ≻ w3
w1 = w2
m1 = m2 ≻ m3
m1 = m2 ≻ m3
m1 = m2 ≻ m3
w3
w2
w1
m3
m2
m1
The assignment on the left-hand side is stable, and the assignment on the right-
hand side is a Pareto improvement where m2 strictly improves his assignment
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and no one is worse o. However, the assignment on the right is unstable as m2
and w2 would like to match with each other rather than w3 and m3, respectively,
i.e., it is a blocking pair.
The example above shows that the approach of starting with an arbitrary stable
assignment and making Pareto improvements does not work, because this need
not preserve stability. Thus, all previous approaches (e.g., Erdil and Ergin (2006,
2008)) computing Pareto-stable assignments in variant models fail. Further, for
the given stable assignment in the above example (left gure), there is only one
Pareto improvement (right gure); thus, the problem cannot be solved by a careful
selection of Pareto improvements.
It is thus unclear whether a Pareto-stable assignment exists in many-to-many
matching markets with general arbitrary preferences for individuals. In this sec-
tion we give a conrmative answer to this question by showing an algorithm
that computes a Pareto-stable assignment. We rst provide a characterization of
Pareto eciency, and then describe the algorithm. With respect to the course
allocation at NTU with homogeneous preferences, we at the end provide two
implementable Pareto-stable matching mechanisms.
A. Characterization of Pareto Eciency
Given the connection between matching and network ow, it is not surprising
that the existence of augmenting paths and cycles in an assignment is closely
related to whether it can be improved, i.e., its Pareto eciency. The main dier-
ence in the context of stable assignment is that nodes have preferences in addition
to capacities. Thus, augmenting paths and cycles must improve not only the size
of an assignment, but also its quality, as determined by node preferences. The
formal denitions are as follows.
DEFINITION 4 (Augmenting Path): Given an assignment  = (mw), we say
that [m0; w1;m1; : : : ; w`;m`; w`+1] is an augmenting path if (i)
P
w m0w < cm0
and
P
m mw`+1 < cw`+1, (ii) mkwk = 1 and mk 1wk = 0 for all k, and (iii) mk
weakly prefers wk+1 to wk and wk weakly prefers mk 1 to mk.
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The rst condition states that the capacities of m0 and w`+1 are not exhausted.
The second condition states that pairs alternatively are not and are in the cur-
rent assignment  along the path. The last condition ensures that we are able to
achieve a Pareto improvement by reassigning matches according to the augment-
ing path. That is, removing all pairs (mk; wk) and matching all pairs (mk; wk+1)
produces a feasible assignment, which is a Pareto improvement over  (where no
one is worse o and m0 and w`+1 are better o).
DEFINITION 5 (Augmenting Cycle): Given an assignment  = (ij), we say
that [m1; w2;m2; : : : ; w`;m`; w1;m1] is an augmenting cycle if (i) mkwk = 1 and
mkwk+1 = 0 for all k (where w`+1 = w1) (ii) mk weakly prefers wk+1 to wk and
wk weakly prefers mk 1 to mk, and at least one of these preferences is strict.
Again, we are able to match all pairs (mk; wk+1) and unmatch all pairs (mk; wk)
in an augmenting cycle to get a Pareto improvement. For a given assignment, an
augmenting path or cycle can be found easily using a network ow approach.
The following lemma characterizes the relation between stable assignment and
augmenting path and cycle (its proof is the same as the one for a many-to-one
matching market (Erdil and Ergin 2008)).
LEMMA 1: A feasible assignment is Pareto-ecient if and only if it has no
augmenting path or cycle.
B. Computing a Pareto-Stable Matching
Our algorithm builds on the idea of Roth and Vande Vate (1990), who provide
an alternative to the deferred acceptance algorithm to compute a stable (one-to-
one) matching. Their algorithm can be interpreted as follows. Assume that all
women are present at the beginning, and men `arrive' one by one. We start with
the empty matching. When a new man m arrives, match him to a most preferred
woman w with whom he forms a blocking pair, if any; if this woman was already
matched to a man m0, set m0 free and consider him as the next arriving man; the
algorithm runs iteratively until all men have arrived. Because every woman who
changes her partner in this process gets a strict improvement and no woman ever
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becomes worse o, the algorithm terminates, and the nal matching is stable,
because by construction the matching at every man's arrival is stable.
In our algorithm, all individuals are initially available; women are with full
capacities and men are with null capacity. We consider all men one by one and
increase their capacities unit by unit. When the capacity of a man is increased by
one, we do a sequence of reassignments such that the resulting matching satises
the following invariants (with respect to the current considered capacities):
 Stability preserving: it is always stable.
 Women improving: the assignment of any women does not become worse o.
 No augmenting cycle: it does not contain any augmenting cycle.
An important idea in our algorithm to derive Pareto eciency is that in the
process of reassignments, no augmenting cycles have ever been introduced in the
matching. However, we allow the existence of augmenting paths. The key com-
ponent of our algorithm is a subroutine for eliminating augmenting paths while
preserving stability (and introducing no augmenting cycles). Having constructed
a matching that is stable and contains no augmenting cycles, we apply the subrou-
tine to eliminate augmenting paths in a stability preserving fashion, which nally
yields a Pareto-stable matching as characterized by Lemma 1. The high-level
structure of the algorithm is described below.
Alg-Pareto-Stable algorithm
 Initialization:
 There are no assigned matches (i.e.,  = 0) between M and W.
 All women have their full capacities available.
 Let d = (dm)m2M be a virtual capacity vector of men;
initially dm = 0 for m 2M.
 While there is m 2M such that dm < cm, run Increase-Cap(d).
 While there is an augmenting path P, run Eliminate-Path(P ).
 Return the final assignment .
We have the following claim. (The details of the two subroutines and their
analyses are rather technical and thus are deferred to Appendix D.)
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THEOREM 1: For any many-to-many matching market with arbitrary prefer-
ences, a Pareto-stable assignment always exists and can be eciently computed
by the algorithm Alg-Pareto-Stable.
C. Multiple Preferences
In the class registration application at NTU, students submit two preferences for
PE and UE, respectively. Our algorithm continues to work for the settings with
such multiple preferences. In general, for each individual x, the other side of the
market is divided into (not necessarily disjoint) partitions S1(x); S2(x); : : : ; S`(x),
where x has a preference (again, can be incomplete and have ties) and a capacity
cxk for each partition Sk(x). Further, x has a universal capacity cx that bounds
the total number of partners that can be matched to x among all partitions.
Observe that there are now two types of capacity constraints for each individual:
a universal one and a local one for each partition. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that cx  cxk for any k. Note that there could be no relation
between cx and
P
k cxk. The preference model discussed in the previous sections
corresponds to the special case when there is only one partition (i.e., ` = 1), and
the NTU class registration application corresponds to the case with two partitions
(i.e., ` = 2).
In this extension, the preference of every agent is restricted to every partition.
While partitions are not necessarily disjoint, we assume that the preference lists
of all partitions of an individual are disjoint. This is in accordance with our course
allocation motivation in which the preferences that a student submits for PE and
UE are required to be disjoint. Hence, for a given assignment  = (mu), m and
w form a blocking pair if both of them strictly prefer each other to one of their
assigned partners in the same partition (or if they have remaining capacities).
Our objective is again to nd a Pareto-stable assignment, which can be com-
puted by the same mechanisms described in the previous sections. Observe, how-
ever, that the preference of every agent is essentially with respect to each of its
partitions. Hence, the denition of augmenting path and cycle will be changed
accordingly, i.e., for any node in the path/cycle, its two neighbors must be from
the same partition.
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D. Pareto-Improving Draft Mechanism
In the course allocation problem at NTU, the homogeneity of the course pref-
erences helps us to design implementable Pareto-stable matching mechanisms,
in addition to the algorithm above that works for general many-to-many match-
ing frameworks. In this subsection, we present a mechanism called the Pareto-
improving draft mechanism, which incorporates the HBS draft mechanism (Budish
and Cantillon 2012) with the augmenting paths/cycles elimination process. The
mechanism is described as follows (assume that there are L priority levels of
students).
Pareto-improving draft mechanism
For ` = 1; : : : ; L: In each round `, consider students in the `-th priority group.
Consider all these students one by one in a random order.
 Each considered student receives his/her most preferred course among the
remaining available courses (under the capacity constraint and breaking ties
randomly).
 After the assignment, consider all students who have been assigned courses
(including those in higher priority groups) and all courses, eliminate
student-sided augmenting paths/cycles until there is none left.
The Pareto-improving draft mechanism rst considers students according to
their priorities, and among students who are in the same priority level, assigns
one course at a time over a series of rounds, according to the students' preferences.
This is similar to the HBS draft mechanism and NTU's current mechanism. The
main dierence is that with ties in students' preferences, we also do a sequence
of augmenting paths/cycles eliminations to derive Pareto eciency. Specically,
in the mechanism, we use student-sided augmenting paths/cyles elimination12 to
ensure that each considered student, among all feasible assignments, is matched
with his/her best possible assignment while not hurting all previously matched
students. By the rule of the mechanism and the one-sided Pareto eciency
12The student-sided augmenting paths/cycles here only consider the welfare of students, i.e., an aug-
menting path/cycle only requires that no students are worse o and at least one student is strictly better
o. This is similar to the denition in Erdil and Ergin (2008), but a bit dierent from the ones dened
earlier in Section IV.A in which welfare takes both sides of the market into account.
12For the rst step when considering the rst choice of all students (in any priority group), the
augmenting paths/cycles eliminations are with respect to the unit capacity of all students; for all other
steps, the capacities of students are two, as assumed in the model.
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characterization of Erdil and Ergin (2008), the mechanism actually computes
a students-sided Pareto-ecient matching. Further, the following theorem says
that it satises two-sided Pareto eciency and stability, i.e., Pareto stability.
THEOREM 2: The Pareto-improving draft mechanism computes a Pareto-stable
matching.
E. Pareto-Improving Serial Dictatorship Mechanism
The Alg-Pareto-Stable algorithm and Pareto-improving draft mechanism
presented above involve tie-breaking and may lead to dierent outcomes for dif-
ferent implementations. In general, a Pareto-stable matching mechanism is not
strategyproof, even for one-to-one matching markets with ties (see Example 2
in Erdil and Ergin (2008)). In our setting, the same observation holds for the
draft mechanism even when all courses have homogeneous preferences, as the
following example shows.
EXAMPLE 6: There are two students m1;m2 with a capacity of two each and
three courses w1; w2; w3 each with unit capacity. Their preferences are as follows:
w3
w2
w1
m2
m1
w3 ≻ w2
w1 ≻ w2
m1 = m2
m1 = m2
m1 = m2
w3
w2
w1
m2
m1
There are two Pareto-stable matchings 1 = f(m1; fw1; w2g); (m2; w3)g and 2 =
f(m1; w1); (m2; fw2; w3g)g. In the implementation of the Pareto-improving draft
mechanism, if there is a positive probability to output 2, then m1 can misre-
port his preference to be w2  w1, then the mechanism will always output 1
(although 2 is still a Pareto-stable assignment) and m1 is better o. Similarly,
if the mechanism has a positive probability to output 1, then m2 can benet by
manipulation.
Is any implementation of Pareto-stable matching mechanisms strategyproof for
students? It turns out that the answer is armative in our setting when courses
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have homogeneous preferences. The mechanism, called the Pareto-improving se-
rial dictatorship mechanism, combines the random serial dictatorship mechanism
and augmenting paths/cycles elimination. The mechanism is described as below
(assume there are L priority levels for all students).
Pareto-improving serial dictatorship mechanism
For ` = 1; : : : ; L: In each round `, consider students in the `-th priority level.
Consider all these students one by one in a random order.
 Each considered student receives all of his/her most preferred courses among
the remaining available courses (under the capacity constraint and breaking
ties randomly).
 After the assignment, consider all students who have been assigned courses
(including those in higher priority groups) and all courses, eliminate
student-sided augmenting paths/cycles until there is none left.
Similar to the draft mechanism, here we also use student-sided augmenting
paths/cyles elimination to derive Pareto eciency. The key dierence is that it
assigns courses all-at-once while the draft mechanism assigns courses to students
one-at-a-time.
THEOREM 3: The Pareto-improving serial dictatorship mechanism outputs a
Pareto-stable matching and is strategyproof for students.
Draft versus dictatorship. The Pareto-improving draft and serial dictatorship
mechanisms both satisfy the aforementioned \good" properties including pairwise
and group stability, and one-sided and two-sided Pareto eciency. In addition, the
Pareto-improving serial dictatorship mechanism is strategyproof. However, the
dictatorship mechanism may trigger the \callousness" phenomenon as described
in Budish and Cantillon (2012). The following example illustrates how the draft
mechanism can potentially solve the callousness issue by avoiding severely unfair
allocations.
EXAMPLE 7: There are two students m1;m2 each with a capacity of two and
two courses w1; w2 each with unit capacity. m1 has preference w1  w2, and m2
has preference w2  w1. Both courses have homogeneous preferences m1 = m2.
The Pareto-improving serial dictatorship mechanism assigns both courses to either
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student who has a higher ranking after the initial random tie breaking. But a fairer
allocation would be to allocate each student one course, i.e., assign w1 to m1 and
w2 to m2, which is exactly the outcome of the draft mechanism.
As Budish and Cantillon (2012) documented about the HBS elective course al-
location, the callous behavior harms eciency in the sense that the welfare costs
of using strategyproof dictatorship are much larger than the welfare costs of ma-
nipulability. As a consequence, Budish (2012) suggested the need for second-best
alternatives to strategyproofness, e.g., incentive compatibility in large markets as
discussed in Section III.D.
Incentive compatibility has been an important condition in various market de-
sign problems. However, one should also note that constraints always come with
costs. As Budish and Cantillon (2012) showed for the course allocation data at
HBS, on some simple measures of welfare the non-strategyproof draft mecha-
nism outperforms the strategyproof dictatorship mechanism. As a special case of
general dictatorship mechanisms, the Pareto-improving serial dictatorship mech-
anism also brings up callous behavior, which can be bad for welfare. Although
the Pareto-improving draft mechanism solves the callousness issue in the Pareto-
improving serial dictatorship mechanism, it is not strategyproof for students. This
tradeo between non-callousness and strategyproofness makes neither of them
perfect for the NTU course allocation problem. In Section V, we compare the
simulation results on both mechanisms to get a sense of which is better, if not
perfect.
V. Simulations
We use NTU's course allocation data on PE and UE for three consecutive aca-
demic years: 2010, 2011 and 2012 to examine the eectiveness of introducing ties
to students' preferences and to compare the Pareto-improving draft and dicta-
torship mechanisms with NTU's current mechanism. The data consist of (a) the
number of course vacancies; (b) students' strict preferences for up to ve PE and
ve UE courses, separately; and (c) course allocation results from NTU's current
mechanism (after the manual adjustment process) (listed in Table 1). The input
information for our simulations is specied as follows:
28 MONTH YEAR
 Course preferences: we assume with little loss of generality that courses' ho-
mogeneous preferences for students are based only on the students' study year.
That is, all courses strictly prefer nal year students to penultimate year stu-
dents, and so on. This assumption is for the simplicity of simulations.
 Course capacities: the above (a) provided by the data set.
 Student preferences: the above (b) provided by the data set. (Random ties are
introduced to students' preferences to simulate the performance of the proposed
mechanisms with indierences in preferences.)
 Student capacities: either one or two, see the specic setup in the simulations
described below.
Before introducing ties in students' preference lists, we rst take a closer look
at the distribution of the lengths of students' preference lists, which are depicted
in Figure 2. For both PE and UE, it can be seen that the length of preferences
is almost symmetrically distributed, and the average lengths are 3.00 and 3.07,
respectively. For preference lists no longer than three, a maximum of two ties
can be introduced. Further, in the recent course registration survey (see Figure 1
Question 3), 35 percent of students preferred two levels of preferences and 23
percent preferred three levels, representing a major portion of all surveyed stu-
dents and over 76 percent of whom preferred to have ties.13 Given the average
lengths and survey information, in our simulations we consider two scenarios: two
or three levels in students' preference lists.
 Two levels means that there is one strict `' and the preference list of a student
is divided into two levels at random.
 Three levels means that there are two strict `' and the preference list of a
student is divided into three levels at random.
Note that a student is indierent between the courses in the same level. For
example, if a student has preference A  B  C  D  E, then A = B  C =
D = E is a (random) realization with two levels and A  B = C  D = E is a
(random) realization with three levels.
13We note that the current limit of a maximum of ve courses for PE/UE preference lists does not
impose a signicant constraint against students indicating all of the courses that they like, as the survey
results show that 75 percent of the students are satised with the upper limit of ve courses (see Figure 1
Question 4).
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Figure 2. Distribution of the lengths of students' PE and UE Preference Lists.
Next we describe our simulation environments and results. Due to the ran-
domness involved in introducing ties into students' preferences, ve independent
computations are performed for each of the simulation environments, and the
percentage is the average of the ve experiments. For the rest of the paper, per-
centages are measured as the total number of allocations over the total number
of vacancies, unless otherwise specied.
A. Experimental Environment I
We consider three scenarios for simulations.
 Pure PE. We only consider PE courses; thus, we assume that each student has
unit capacity and only consider his/her preference for PE courses.
 Pure UE. We only consider UE courses; thus, we assume that each student has
unit capacity and only consider his/her preference for UE courses. Note that
the rst two scenarios are essentially many-to-one matchings.
 Combined PE+UE. Here all of the courses are pooled together. Note that if
a course falls into both the PE and UE categories, recall that in the NTU's
current system, two capacities of the course are specied manually for PE and
UE, respectively. In our simulations here, we merge the two separate capacities,
making it a single capacity for each such course. Each student still has two
separate preferences, one for PE and one for UE; the capacity of the student
is in the format of 1 + 1, i.e., the student can get at most one PE course
and at most one UE course, and it is possible that the student is allocated two
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courses in total. Note that this scenario precisely captures the course allocation
requirements of NTU, and is the one by which we quantitatively evaluate the
performance of our mechanism, which introduces ties into students' preferences.
In the three scenarios, students essentially have unit capacities (in the third
scenario, a student with two separate preferences can be treated as two students,
among whom one has preferences consisting of PE only and the other has prefer-
ences consisting of UE only). In such cases, one can easily notice that the draft
and dictatorship mechanisms are equivalent. In practice, we run simulations using
both mechanisms and the results do appear to be the same as expected, except for
some small deviations due to the random nature of the mechanisms. Therefore,
we do not distinguish these minor dierences caused purely by the randomness
in the algorithms, and instead focus on the eects of allowing ties into students'
preferences. The simulation results for the total number of allocations are shown
in Table 2 and the corresponding statistics on the number of unassigned students
for combined PE+UE are summarized in Table 3.14 Next, we give a detailed
explanation for the statistics in each column of Table 2 (using the data from
2010).
 Maximummatching. We need a generally reasonable benchmark to measure the
performance of dierent matchings. (Note that the total number of students
or course vacancies does not qualify, as no feasible matching can match the
bound.) To this end, we consider a maximum cardinality matching (i.e., one has
the maximum number of assigned pairs) from the set of all mutually acceptable
pairs. The size of a maximum cardinality matching provides a theoretical upper
bound on all feasible matchings. For PE, UE and combined PE+UE, the size
of a maximum matching in 2010 is 7,140, 8,958 and 16,536, which takes 87.95
percent, 63.18 percent and 74.17 percent of the total vacancies, respectively.
 NTU's current mechanism. NTU's current mechanism is employed with respect
to the given preferences. Note that the statistics here dier slightly from those
in Table 1, as we consider slightly simplied preferences for the courses and
do not include the manual adjustment process. It can be seen that in 2010,
14The percentages in this table are calculated as the total number of unassigned students over the
total number of students.
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Table 2|Experimental Results I: Total Number of Allocations
Course
Maximum
matching
NTU's current
mechanism
Pareto-Stable
without ties
Pareto-Stable
with 3 levels
Pareto-Stable
with 2 levels
PE
7,140 6,615 6,647 6,720 6,852
87.95% 81.49% 81.88% 82.78% 84.41%
2010 UE
8,958 8,142 8,162 8,295 8,515
63.18% 57.43% 57.57% 58.51% 60.06%
PE+UE
16,536 14,990 15,105 15,312 15,670
74.17% 67.23% 67.75% 68.68% 70.28%
PE
7,725 7,045 7,150 7,342 7,368
76.55% 69.81% 70.85% 72.75% 73.01%
2011 UE
8,041 7,495 7,537 7,626 7,784
52.41% 48.85% 49.13% 49.71% 50.74%
PE+UE
15,803 14,526 14,627 14,833 15,190
62.13% 57.11% 57.51% 58.32% 59.72%
PE
7,308 6,726 6,762 6,838 7,005
78.54% 72.28% 72.67% 73.49% 75.28%
2012 UE
8,075 7,556 7,574 7,672 7,819
49.66% 46.47% 46.58% 47.18% 48.09%
PE+UE
15,412 14,283 14,350 14,530 14,855
60.29% 55.87% 56.13% 56.84% 58.11%
about 81.49 percent of PE vacancies, 57.43 percent of UE vacancies and 67.23
percent of the combined PE+UE vacancies are allocated. We will compare the
performance of our mechanisms to these statistics.
 Pareto-Stable without ties. In this column, the draft/dictatorship mechanism
is employed with strict preferences for the students. In comparison with the
allocations using NTU's current mechanism, for 2010 we see a 0.39 percent
improvement for PE, a 0.14 percent improvement for UE allocations and a
0.52 percent improvement for combined PE+UE. Note that NTU's current
mechanism also generates a Pareto-stable matching if considering the strict
students' preferences. The marginal improvement in the number of allocations
comes from the dierences in the implementations of the algorithms.
 Pareto-Stable with 3 levels. In this column, the draft/dictatorship mechanism
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is employed with three random levels on students' preferences. That is, each
student's preference has at most three levels. Here we observe improvements of
1.29 percent, 1.08 percent and 1.45 percent for PE, UE and combined PE+UE,
respectively, compared to NTU's current mechanism.
 Pareto-Stable with 2 levels. In this column, the draft/dictatorship mechanism
is employed with two random levels on students' preferences. That is, each
student's preference has at most two levels. We observe further improvements
here of 2.92 percent, 2.63 percent and 3.05 percent for PE, UE and combined
PE+UE, respectively. The last two columns show the simulation results after
introducing ties into students' preferences, indicating that it can improve the
overall eciency of students.15
We also observe improvements in the total number of allocations after intro-
ducing ties into students' preferences for 2011 and 2012. In 2011, there are 2.94
percent, 0.86 percent and 1.21 percent improvements for PE, UE and combined
PE+UE, respectively, after we divide preferences into three levels. The improve-
ments for 2012 are 1.21 percent, 0.71 percent and 0.97 percent. Furthermore, we
see more signicant improvements of 3.20 percent, 1.89 percent and 2.61 percent
for PE, UE and combined PE+UE, respectively, when we divide the preference
lists into two levels, with improvements of 3.00 percent, 1.62 percent and 2.24
percent, respectively, in 2012.
In summary, for the combined PE+UE scenario, after introducing ties into stu-
dents' preferences, over the three years we see an average improvement of 1.21
percent and 2.63 percent for three and two levels of preferences, respectively.
This translates to roughly 292 or 639 more student-course assignments every year
which, compared to the allocation results from NTU's current mechanism, sig-
nicantly improves overall students' social eciency. The statistics for combined
PE+UE of the simulations are also depicted in Figure 3.
15Note that for the PE and UE scenarios, students have unit capacity, the allocations are therefore
many-to-one matchings. For the column `Pareto-Stable without ties', the simulations are equivalent to
Erdil and Ergin's algorithm (Erdil and Ergin 2008), which computes a Pareto-stable matching for many-
to-one markets with one-sided indierences. For the last two columns `Pareto-Stable with 3 and 2 levels',
the simulations are equivalent to Erdil and Ergin's algorithm (Erdil and Ergin 2006), which computes a
Pareto-stable matching for many-to-one markets with two-sided indierences.
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In addition to improving the total number of allocations, as the following table
shows, we also observe a decrease in the total number of unassigned students
of 2.87 percent, 2.18 percent and 2.42 percent for the three years, respectively.
(Unassigned students refer to those who are not allocated to any course.)
Table 3|Experimental Results I: Number of Unassigned Students for PE+UE
NTU's current
mechanism
Pareto-Stable
without ties
Pareto-Stable
with 3 levels
Pareto-Stable
with 2 levels
2010
1,866 1,766 1,679 1,479
13.85% 13.11% 12.46% 10.98%
2011
883 859 779 636
7.80% 7.59% 6.88% 5.62%
2012
1,007 970 885 728
8.73% 8.40% 7.67% 6.31%
B. Experimental Environment II
In the simulations described above for the combined PE+UE scenario, we ex-
plicitly set the capacities of students to be 1+1. This assumption is in accordance
with NTU's current system and helps us to compare the simulation results to the
current mechanism. In practice, however, students may get more than one course
from a category (either PE or UE) after the manual adjustment period. This
fact is illustrated by the statistics in Table 1, where the number of allocations
for UE is larger than the number of students in 2011. The 1+1 capacity is not a
sharp constraint and is purely for equitability, resulting in signicant ineciency
in course allocation. Thus, in the following simulations we assume that each stu-
dent still has an overall capacity of two, but can be allocated any two courses
(either one PE and one UE, or two PEs, or two UEs) from his/her preference.
This change reects practical situations in which students may have strong prefer-
ences for taking courses from one category (e.g., considering a student with 3 PE
and 25 UE academic units left, then the student certainly prefers to get two UE
courses rather than one PE and one UE). An overall capacity of two is imposed to
allow for some degree of balance and fairness among students at dierent levels,
34 MONTH YEAR
by avoiding allocating almost all of the courses to senior students while junior
students receive no courses.
When students have multi-unit capacities, implementations of the draft and
dictatorship mechanisms will lead to dierent results. The main source of such
dierences is that in the draft mechanism students are allocated courses one-
at-a-time while in the dictatorship mechanism students are allocated courses up
to his/her capacity all-at-once. Thus, in addition to analyzing the eciency
improvements generated by introducing ties, we also focus on the comparisons
between the Pareto-improving draft and dictatorship mechanisms.
Similar to the simulations described in the previous subsection, here we also
consider three scenarios: pure PE, pure UE, and combined PE+UE. Given that
students can now get two courses from the same category, and in practice they may
have preferences for the two categories, in the simulations of combined PE+UE
we randomly concatenate a student's PE and UE preferences into one list:
 If a student prefers category PE to UE, the new single preference is the PE
preference followed by the UE preference.
 If a student prefers category UE to PE, the new single preference is the UE
preference followed by the PE preference.
 If a student is indierent between PE and UE, the new single preference is by
randomly merging the PE and UE preferences (while keeping the same ranking
for those PE and UE courses).
In our simulations, students are uniformly distributed between the above three
types.
To introduce ties into students' preferences, for the PE and UE scenarios, the
preference lists are randomly divided into two levels. For the combined PE+UE
scenario, the concatenated preference lists are divided into four levels: one strict
`' in PE's preference, one strict `' in UE's preference, and one strict `' in the
concatenation of the two preferences. If a student is indierent between the two
categories, the three strict `' are placed at random.
Table 4 shows the simulation results in terms of the number of allocations
from the Pareto-improving draft dictatorship mechanisms when students have
a capacity of two and ties in preferences. In addition to the total number of
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allocations, we also compare the draft and dictatorship mechanisms by two other
measures: average rank16 and the total number of unallocated students. The
statistics are given in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Note that Table 6 only refers
to the PE+UE scenario and the percentages are calculated as the total number
of unassigned students over the total number of students.
Table 4|Experimental Results II: Total Number of Allocations
2010 2011 2012
Course Draft Dictatorship Draft Dictatorship Draft Dictatorship
PE
7,452 7,386 8,798 8,690 8,255 8,185
91.80% 90.98% 87.18% 86.11% 88.72% 87.96%
UE
10,046 9,926 10,479 10,313 10,399 10,243
70.86% 70.01% 68.30% 67.22% 63.95% 63.00%
PE+UE
17,354 16,979 17,803 17,473 17,308 17,015
77.83% 76.15% 70.00% 68.70% 67.70% 66.56%
Table 5|Experimental Results II: Average Rank
2010 2011 2012
Course Draft Dictatorship Draft Dictatorship Draft Dictatorship
PE 1.73 1.93 1.72 1.88 1.64 1.81
UE 1.96 1.96 1.83 1.95 1.78 1.95
PE+UE 1.85 1.85 1.72 1.79 1.66 1.74
From the statistics, we can see that for all of the scenarios, the draft mechanism
outperforms the dictatorship mechanism in terms of the total number of alloca-
tions, the average rank and the total number of unassigned students, despite the
fact that it is non-strategyproof. The dominant relationship is especially signi-
cant for the number of unassigned students. With the draft mechanism, only 5.06
percent, 3.15 percent and 3.90 percent of the students are unassigned any course
16The idea of using average ranks as a simple measure of welfare is motivated by Budish and Cantillon
(2012). The average rank statistics here are calculated as the average rank of the courses in the student's
assigned bundle based on the ranks in the strict preferences because it is impossible to get the real
preferences with ties. Consequently, these average rank statistics are not the real average ranks. However,
for the purpose of comparisons between two mechanisms, they are already sucient.
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Table 6|Experimental Results II: Number of Unassigned Students for PE+UE
2010 2011 2012
PE+UE Draft Dictatorship Draft Dictatorship Draft Dictatorship
Number 682 3,104 357 1,241 450 1,518
Percentage 5.06% 23.04% 3.15% 10.96% 3.90% 13.15%
for the three years, respectively, as compared to 23.04 percent, 10.96 percent and
13.15 percent with the dictatorship mechanism.
These statistics also demonstrate the negative eects on welfare that result
from the \callousness" phenomenon in the dictatorship mechanism. The results
support the conclusions of Budish and Cantillon (2012) concerning the role of
strategyproofness in practical market design; that is, the callousness costs of a
strategyproof dictatorship mechanism are much larger than the costs of manipu-
lability in a draft mechanism (Budish 2012), especially in large marketplaces such
as course allocation. Overall, if compared with the total allocation numbers from
NTU's current mechanism in Table 2, there is approximately 10.60 percent, 12.89
percent and 11.83 percent improvement for the three years, respectively, with the
dictatorship mechanism. These statistics are also illustrated in Figure 3.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We study the course allocation at NTU and formulate the problem as a many-
to-many matching market with preferences. To improve overall eciency, we
consider introducing ties into students' preferences as a renement to the current
system. The fact that a stable outcome need not be Pareto-ecient with the pres-
ence of ties causes a loss in eciency among the well-established stable solutions.
We therefore employ the solution concept of Pareto stability as a renement to the
solution concept of stability, and establish an algorithm that computes a Pareto-
stable matching for general many-to-many matching markets. We further propose
two competing Pareto-stable matching mechanisms, i.e., Pareto-improving draft
and dictatorship mechanisms, for the course allocation application.
With the designed draft and dictatorship mechanisms, we run simulations on
the real course registration data from three academic years: 2010, 2011 and 2012.
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Our results show signicant improvement in eciency when ties are introduced
into students' preferences. In total, we can see up to 2,597 more course-student
assignments for 2010 (3,263 for 2011 and 3,026 for 2012). This is equivalent
to approximately 11.65 percent (12.83 percent for 2011 and 11.84 percent for
2012) improvement in total eciency. These positive results, summarized in the
following gure, call for changes to NTU's current course allocation system.
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Figure 3. Summary of Simulation Results: Total Number of Allocations
Our simulation results comparing the draft and dictatorship mechanisms in-
dicate that the Pareto-improving draft mechanism outperforms the dictatorship
mechanism in terms of the total number of allocations, the average rank and the
total number of unassigned students, despite the fact that the former is non-
strategyproof. Our results echo the ndings of Budish and Cantillon (2012), who
suggested that strategyproofness has both benets and costs.
Ties are a realistic condition occurring in many matching markets with pref-
erences, especially when individuals have incomplete information. Our work,
following the studies of Erdil and Ergin (2006) and Erdil and Ergin (2008), is de-
voted to improving social eciency in the presence of ties. The models studied in
these works can potentially be applied to other applications with a similar setup.
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Our work considers a number of fundamental solution concepts, including pair-
wise and group stability, and one-sided and two-sided Pareto eciency. We exam-
ine the existence and computation of these solution concepts. These results are of
independent interest and may nd applications in other many-to-many matching
markets.
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Appendix: For Online Publication
NTU Curriculum Structure and Course Registration Process
This section introduces the curriculum structure and course registration process
of NTU. At NTU, an undergraduate needs to fulll both the Major Requirement
and the General Education Requirement (GER). The Major Requirement includes
major core courses, which are compulsory courses to satisfy the program require-
ments, and major prescribed electives, which are courses for specialization in a
particular degree program. The GER is the curriculum requirement for broad-
ening study, which covers key elds of knowledge for all students. It constitutes
about 25 percent to 40 percent of the total curriculum workload and is divided
into 3 classes of studies:
1) GER CORE: these include courses related to Human Resources Manage-
ment, Communication Skills and Singapore Studies.
2) GER Prescribed Electives (PE): the courses represent the key elds of
knowledge broadly relevant to all professions and are categorized into 3
sub-areas of studies:
a) Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences
b) Business and Management
c) Science, Technology and Society
3) GER Unrestricted Electives (UE): these are courses chosen by students to
broaden their learning experience. They may cover any area oered by the
various departments, including, e.g., modern languages, entrepreneurship,
music, and drama courses.
A course can fall into dierent categories simultaneously. For example, the course
Principle of Economics can be in both PE and UE. There is a minimum academic
units requirement for each category of courses for students to full to meet their
graduation requirement. The curriculum structure is shown in Figure A1.
An online Student Automated Registration System (STARS) is currently used
for course registration at NTU. The information of the courses (e.g., time sched-
ules and vacancies) is rst released. The registration takes place over three phases.
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Figure A1. Curriculum Structure at NTU.
In the rst phase, students register for the Major Requirement (major core and
major prescribed electives) and GER CORE courses at their pre-specied date
and time slot. These courses can be registered successfully as long as there are
vacancies available (on a \rst come, rst serve" basis). Almost all students are
able to register for their desired major courses and GER CORE courses in the
rst phase.17
The second phase decides allocations of PE and UE courses by a central-
ized mechanism described in Section I. The rst two phases take place before
17A major reason is that most registrants of a major course are those from the department that
oers the course; therefore, every department can easily manage their oered major courses for its own
students.
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a semester starts. During the rst two weeks at the beginning of a semester,
there is another and nal phase where students can submit appeals for courses
that they are keen to take, drop courses and add courses (provided vacancy avail-
ability). The appeals in this phase are handled manually by program coordinators
from departments on a case by case basis. To ensure that certain special and ur-
gent appeals are fullled, some courses may reserve a few vacancies for this nal
phase.
Responsive Preference with Lattice Structure
We give an example to show a responsive preference with a lattice structure.
Assume that the preference of m over individuals is Pm : (w1  w2 = w3  w4 =
w5) and its capacity is 3, then the lattice structure of m's responsive preference
is shown in Figure B1. Each node in the gure denotes a feasible matching. For
example, the node \f1,2,3g" means that m is matched with fw1; w2; w3g.
Figure B1. Lattice Structure of Responsive Preference.
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Missing Proofs
C1. Proof of Claim 1
PROOF:
This can be seen by the following example: There are three studentsm1;m2;m3
and two courses w1; w2 with unit capacity each. Their preferences are shown in
Figure (a) below.
(a)
w2
w1
m3
m2
m1
w1
w2 ≻ w1
w1 ≻ w2
m1 ≻ m2
m2 ≻ m3 ≻ m1
(b)
w2
w1
m3
m2
m1
(c)
w2
w1
m3
m2
m1
(d)
w2
w1
m3
m2
m1
The rst allocation (m1; w2); (m2; w1) is pairwise stable. However, it can be seen
that fm1;m2g is not group stable as both of them can get better o by swapping
the assigned courses (see Figure (b)). In this case, m3 and w1 form a blocking
pair, which enforces the allocation to Figure (c). Now m1 and w2 form a blocking
pair, which transforms the allocation to Figure (d), in which m2 and w1 are a
blocking pair and the matching returns back to the rst one. Hence, for the
considered instance, it does not admit an allocation that is both pairwise stable
and group stable.
C2. Proof of Proposition 2
PROOF:
Assume without loss of generality thatW has homogeneous preferences overM
and a Pareto stable assignment  = (mw) is notM -side group stable. Then there
is a subset S M such that all members in S can strictly improve his allocation
among reassignments inside S; denote the resulting new matching by 0. Let
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S = fm1;m2; : : : ;mkg, and denote the assignment of each agent x 2 M [W in
 and 0 by (x) and 0(x), respectively. Since  is dominated by 0, we have
0(m) m (m) for all m 2 S. Note that the assignments of all men that are not
in S remain the same in  and 0.
Consider any man m 2 S. Let (m) = fw1; w2; : : : ; wcmg with w1 m w2 m
   m wcm and 0(m) = fw01; w02; : : : ; w0cmg with w01 m w02 m    m w0cm ,
where cm is the capacity of m. We can insert a copy of ; if m is not fully matched
in the two matchings. Then due to responsive preferences, we have w0i m wi for
all i and at least one preference is strict.
As all women have the same preference, we can assume without loss of generality
that the preference of women is complete over men (otherwise, those men who
are unacceptable will never be matched in any feasible assignment). Consider the
following two cases about the structure of the homogeneous preference of W over
S.
Case 1. Women are indierent among all the men in S = fm1;m2; : : : ;mkg. We
consider the exclusive-or structure of the two matchings  and 0.
We rst show that no woman is worse o in 0. Assume otherwise that
there is a woman w1 who is worse o in 
0. Since w1 is indierent between
all men in S, we know that her number of assignments in 0 is less than that
in , i.e., j0(w1)j < j(w1)j. Hence, there must exist a man m1 such that
m1 breaks up the matching with w1 in  and is matched to a new woman
w2 in 
0 in which w2 m1 w1 (due to responsive preferences). Next consider
w2. If all men matched to w2 in  are already matched to her in 
0, i.e.,
(w2)  0(w2), then we know that w2 does not exhaust her capacity in
. Since  is a stable matching, we know that m1 is fully matched in 
and weakly prefers all his assigned parters to w2; this implies, in particular,
w2 =m1 w1. Hence, as m1 improves his assignment in 
0, there must exist
another woman w02 with w02 m1 w1 such that w02 2 0(m1) n (m1) and w02
is fully matched in . For such a case, we switch the name of w2 and w
0
2.
Therefore, there is a man m2 such that m2 breaks up the matching with w2
in  and is matched to a new woman w3 in 
0 in which w3 m2 w2.
We continue with the argument. As the number of men is nite, eventu-
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ally we will have a loop: w;m; w+1;m+1; : : : ; w;m; w in which mi
breaks the matching with wi in  and is matched to wi+1 in 
0 for all i
(where w+1 = w) and wi+1 mi wi. (Note that it is possible that  = 1,
i.e., the loop goes back to the rst woman w1.) If at least one of the prefer-
ences is strict, then we have a Pareto improvement among these agents, this
contradicts the fact that  is Pareto stable. Hence, all these preferences are
tight; in such a case, we can actually still use the old matchings in  (i.e.,
remove all (mi; wi+1) and add (mi; wi) in 
0). Then we can continue with
the same analysis on the exclusive-or structure of the two matchings  and
0, and eventually derive a contradiction.
Therefore, we know that 0 is a Pareto improvement over  (as all men in S
are better o while no woman and any other man are worse o). This leads
to a contradiction to the assumption that  = (mw) is Pareto ecient.
Case 2. There is at least one strict preference over two men in S, say, without
loss of generality, m2  m1. Similar to the above argument, there is a
woman w3 2 0(m2)n(m2) such that w3 m2 w for some w 2 (m2). As 
is a stable matching, w3 must be fully matched in ; thus, there is a man m3
with m3 w3 m2 (again, due stability of ) who breaks the matching with
w3 in  and is matched to a new woman w4 in 
0. As m3 also improves his
assignment in 0, we can again use the same analysis as above to show that
there is a Pareto improvement, which contradicts to the Pareto stability of
 (note that all women w considered in the process weakly prefers m to
m 1).
Therefore, when W have homogeneous preferences over M , a Pareto stable
assignment must be M -side group stable.
C3. Proof of Claim 2
PROOF:
Without loss of generality, we assume that only women have ties in their pref-
erences. Let  be a stable matching and 0 be one derived from  through Pareto
improvement. Then for all x 2M [W , 0(x) x (x), and at least one preference
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is strict.
Assume that 0 is not stable and (m;w) is a blocking pair. Let
(m) =

w1; w2; : : : ; wcm
	
and 0(m) =

w01; w
0
2; : : : ; w
0
cm
	
;
and let
(w) =

m1;m2; : : : ;mcw
	
and 0(w) =

m01;m
0
2; : : : ;m
0
cw
	
:
(We can add ; to the list if one is not fully matched.) We can enumerate the
indices such that w0i m wi, for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; cm and m0j w mj , for all
j = 1; 2; : : : ; cw. Note that wi =m w
0
i if and only if wi and w
0
i are the same
woman. Since (m;w) is a blocking pair for 0, we know that w m w0cm and
m w m0cw .
Case 1: m and w are not matched in . Then w m w0cm m wcm and
m w m0cw w mcw , implying that (m;w) is a blocking pair for , a contradiction.
Case 2: m and w are matched in . Since the assignment of w is not worse
o in 0 and m =2 0(w), there is m0 2 0(w) such that m0 =2 (w) and m0 w m.
Consider m0; as all men have strict preferences and m0 is not worse o in 0, there
is w0 2 (m0) such that w m0 w0. Hence, (m0; w) is a blocking pair for , a
contradiction.
Hence, 0 has no blocking pairs, and the claim follows.
C4. Proof of Theorem 2
PROOF:
Denote the matching computed by the mechanism by . By the rule of eliminat-
ing student-sided augmenting paths/cycles in the mechanism and the characteri-
zation of Pareto eciency (Erdil and Ergin 2006),  is immediately student-sided
Pareto ecient. Then there is no (two-sided) augmenting path under the match-
ing  since no m (i.e., student) can be better o. We claim that there is no
(two-sided) augmenting cycle either. Assume otherwise that there is an augment-
ing cycle [m1; w2;m2; : : : ; w`;m`; w1;m1], where mkwk = 1 and mkwk+1 = 0 for
all k (where w`+1 = w1). Then according to the denition and the fact that no
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m can get strict improvement, there must be some w getting better o; assume
without loss of generality that w1 gets better o, i.e., m`  m1. Due to the
homogeneity property of all w's preferences and the fact that no w gets worse o,
we can derive that m1  m2  m3      m`  m1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, by Lemma 1,  is (two-sided) Pareto ecient.
Next we show that  is stable. The rule of the mechanism implies that for any
two students m1 and m2, if m1 has a higher priority than m2, then m1 does not
envy any course assigned to m2 (i.e., all courses assigned to m1 are at least as
good as any course assigned to m2). Otherwise, when considering augmenting
paths/cycles for the iteration of m1, we would match a better course to m1.
Hence, if there is a blocking pair (m;w), where w strictly prefers m to one of
her assignments m0 (note that m0 cannot be ; due to augmenting paths/cycles
elimination at the iteration of m), i.e., m  m0. By the rule of the mechanism, m
must be in a higher priority level than m0; and by above discussion, m does not
envy any course assigned to m0, which contradicts the assumption that m and w
are a blocking pair. Hence, the mechanism always generates a stable matching.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
C5. Proof of Theorem 3
PROOF:
The proof of Pareto stability is the same as the one for Theorem 2. To the end
of the strategyproofness, it can be seen that for each considered student, among
the remaining available courses, we allocate him/her the best possible courses.
Thus, the student has no incentive to lie. In the later augmenting paths/cycles
eliminations, while the assignment of the student can be changed, a simple but
critical invariant holds: Given the assignments of all previously considered stu-
dents, we always allocate the best possible courses to the student. Therefore, it
is a dominant strategy for the student to submit his/her true preference. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
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Details of the Algorithm
Note that in the algorithm, we always maintain the invariant that the algorithm
contains no augmenting cycles. Why do we need such a condition, whereas it
is allowed to have augmenting paths? Observe that the reason that a Pareto
improvement may not preserve stability is that the path or cycle corresponding
to the Pareto improvement contains a matched pair (m;w) where both m and
w are also matched to a less preferred agent, say w0 and m0. When the match
(m;w) is removed in the reassignment process of the augmenting path/cycle, even
thoughm and w could receive better partners in the path or cycle, they will prefer
to be matched to each other instead of w0 and m0 respectively. For augmenting
path, however, we can always start reassignment from one side of the path (say,
the man), and stop proceeding along the path when we reach such a woman w
(then (m0; w) is unmatched and the process restarts). In this stability-preserving
process, a woman becomes strictly better o. However, for the pair (m;w) in an
augmenting cycle, we would need to release both (m0; w) and (m;w0) to preserve
stability. That is, we would no longer have the monotonically improving property
for women's assignments, which is critical to the analysis of the algorithm.
Note that in the algorithm,  = (mw)m2M;w2W and (dm)m2M are global vari-
ables in both subroutines. The rst subroutine, Increase-Cap, increases the
virtual capacity of a man by one and does a number of reassignments to ensure
the three invariants listed above (in particular, it guarantees that the assign-
ment is stable for the increased virtual capacity vector). The second subroutine,
Eliminate-Path, eliminates all possible augmenting paths to derive a Pareto-
ecient assignment in a stability preserving fashion. After all augmenting paths
have been eliminated, by Lemma 1, the returned assignment is Pareto-stable.
While the algorithm may look a bit complicated, the fact that no women ever get
worse o in the process implies a simple, but critical, structure of the algorithm:
we iteratively do a sequence of reassignments to improve women's assignments
while preserving stability and containing no augmenting cycle. If at any moment
in the algorithm a woman's assignment gets strictly improved, no matter at which
stage the algorithm is, we terminate that thread immediately and go to Step (2)
of the main algorithm to repeat the process given the current virtual capacity
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vector d.
Next we describe the two subroutines in detail in the following subsections.
(All discussions are with respect to the considered virtual capacity vector.) In
the algorithm, for any (augmenting) cycle C and a pair (m;w) 2 C, we use
C n f(m;w)g to denote the path by removing pair (m;w) from C.
D1. Subroutine One: Capacity Increment
The rst subroutine that increases virtual capacities of the men is the following.
Increase-Cap(d)
1) Pick an arbitrary man m with dm < cm
2) Let dm  dm + 1, i.e., increase the virtual capacity of m by one
3) Let S = fw j (m;w) is a blocking pairg
4) Let T = fw 2 S j m prefers w  w0 for any w0 2 Sg
5) If T = ; (i.e., there is no blocking pair), return
6) Otherwise
a) If there exists w 2 T such that adding match (m;w) does not introduce
any augmenting cycle
 pick such a woman w0
 add match (m;w0)
b) Otherwise
 pick an arbitrary w0 2 T
 let C be a potential augmenting cycle by adding (m;w0)
 let P =

m
Cnf(m;w0)g         ! w0

be the path from m to w0 through C n
f(m;w0)g
 run Eliminate-Path(P )
c) If w0 (defined either in Step (6.a) or (6.b)) is over-matched (i.e.,
matched to more than cw0 neighbors)
 let m0 be a least preferred man matched to w0 where deleting
(m0; w0) does not introduce an augmenting cycle
 delete match (m0; w0)
 let dm0  dm0   1
 return
d) Otherwise, return
When the virtual capacity of m is increased by one, there might be some block-
ing pairs, among which the subroutine tries to match m to one that he prefers
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most (w0 2 T in the above description). However, this could introduce potential
augmenting cycles (Step 6(b)). Instead of matching m and w0 directly, the sub-
routine considers a potential augmenting cycle C incurred by (m;w0) and tries to
do reassignments according the other path from m to w0 along the cycle. Finally,
if w0 is over-matched, then we delete one of her least preferred assignments with-
out incurring any augmenting cycles and delete the virtual capacity of that man
by one. This guarantees that the assignment remains stable, and the assignment
of w0 strictly improves.
The existence of m0 in Step 6(c) is guaranteed by the following lemma.
LEMMA 2: Given a stable matching without augmenting cycles, for any woman
w, let S  M be the subset of men matched to w to whom w is least preferred.
Then there is m 2 S such that deleting match (m;w) does not introduce any
augmenting cycle.
D2. Subroutine Two: Augmenting Path Elimination
Consider a given stable assignment, assume there is an augmenting path P =
[m0; w1;m1; : : : ; w`;m`; w`+1], where (mi; wi) is in the assignment and (mi; wi+1)
is not. Note that it is possible that an individual x (either a man or a woman)
or a pair (x; y) appears more than once in P . In this subsection, when we refer
to an individual x 2 P or a pair (x; y) 2 P , we denote the corresponding one at
that position of P .
Before describing the subroutine, we will rst consider a truncation process,
which deletes some pairs in a given augmenting path according to dierent ap-
pearances of the same agent and will be used in the subroutine.
Truncation.
For a given augmenting path P , we consider the following truncation function.
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Truncate-Path(P )
1) while one of the following "if" conditions holds
 If there is m such that P = [: : : ;m;w1; : : : ; w2;m; : : :] and m weakly
prefers w1 to w2
{ truncate P = [: : : ;m; (w1; : : : ; w2;m; ) : : :]
 If there is w such that P = [: : : ; w;m1; : : : ;m2; w; : : :] and w weakly prefers
m2 to m1
{ truncate P = [: : : ; w; (m1; : : : ;m2; w; ) : : :]
2) Return path P
It can be seen that if Truncate-Path(P ) is executed, by the rules of the
truncation, no pair (x; y) can appear more than once after truncation. However,
it is still possible that an individual appears more than once (e.g., whenm strictly
prefers w2 to w1, we do not truncate the two occurrences of m). The truncation
process is necessary in our algorithm; in particular, it is important to the analysis
of termination of the algorithm.
In Truncate-Path(P ), if a truncation is executed at x (a man or a woman),
we denote by  (x) the truncated path. That is,  (x) = [m;w1; : : : ; w2;m] if
x = m, and  (x) = [w;m1; : : : ;m2; w] if x = w.
We have the following observations.
PROPOSITION 3: For any given augmenting path P , if a truncation is executed
at x, then  (x) forms a cycle and every individual involved is indierent between
its two neighbors in the cycle.
PROOF:
We will only prove the claim for the rst case when Truncate-Path(P ) is
executed at a man; the argument for the second case is similar. Assume that the
given augmenting path P = [: : : ;m;w1; : : : ; w2;m; : : :] is truncated between the
two occurrences of m. By the rule of truncation, m weakly prefers w1 to w2; by
the rule of augmenting path P , all individuals weakly prefer his/her unmatched
neighbor to matched neighbor. Hence, [m;w1; : : : ; w2;m] forms a cycle and ev-
eryone is indierent between its two neighbors (otherwise m strictly prefers w1 to
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w2, it is an augmenting cycle, which contradicts to the fact that no augmenting
cycle ever appears in the course of the algorithm).
PROPOSITION 4: For any given augmenting path P , if a truncation is executed
at x and x strictly prefers its one neighbor to the other for one occurrence of x
in the truncation, then x still strictly prefers one neighbor to the other after
truncation.
PROOF:
We will only prove the claim when x is a man m; the argument for woman
is similar. Consider the augmenting path P = [: : : ; w1;m;w2; : : : ; w3;m;w4; : : :]
and a truncation is executed at m. Assume that m strictly prefers w2 to w1.
Since P is an augmenting path, we know that m weakly prefers w4 to w3. By
Proposition 3, m is indierent between w2 and w3. Therefore, after truncation m
strictly prefers one neighbor w4 to the other w1. The same argument holds if the
strict preference occurs at the second occurrence m (i.e., m strictly prefers w4 to
w3).
LEMMA 3: For any given augmenting path P , Truncate-Path(P ) returns an
augmenting path as well.
PROOF:
Again we will only prove the claim for the rst case of Truncate-Path(P )
and the second case follows similarly. For the path P = [: : : ;m;w1; : : : ; w2;m; : : :]
with the truncation for the middle of the two occurrences ofm, if the rstm is the
beginning of path P , then certainly after truncation it is still a valid augmenting
path. Otherwise, we can write P as [: : : ; w0;m;w1; : : : ; w2;m;w3 : : :] (note that
the end of the path must be a woman). Notice thatm weakly prefers w1 to w0, and
w3 to w2. Further, we have m is indierent between w1 and w2 by Proposition 3.
Hence, m weakly prefers w3 to w0, which implies the desired result.
Elimination.
We next describe the subroutine to eliminate augmenting paths while preserving
the three invariants listed at the beginning of the section. Note that for any
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augmenting path, its one side must be a man and the other side must be a
woman. The subroutine starts from the man side and considers pairs one by one.
Hence, for any man-woman pair in the path, the objective is to match them; and
for any woman-man pair in the path, the objective is to unmatch them.
Eliminate-Path(P )
1) Assume P = [m; w1;m1; : : : ; w]
2) Let e = (m; w1) be the first pair on path P
3) while e 6= ;
 If e is not a match (i.e., e = (m;w))
{ if adding match (m;w) does not introduce an augmenting cycle
a) add match (m;w)
b) if w is not over-matched, return
c) if w strictly prefers m to a current partners
 let m0 be a least preferred man matched to w where deleting
(m0; w) does not introduce an augmenting cycle (by Lemma 2,
such m0 exists)
 delete match (m0; w) and let dm0  dm0   1
 return to Step 2 of the main algorithm Alg-Pareto-Stable to
run Increase-Cap
d) else let e be the next pair after (m;w) in P
{ otherwise
e) let C = [m;w01;m
0
1; : : : ; w
0
k;m
0
k; w;m] be such a potential cycle if
adding (m;w)
f) expand P =

m; : : : ;m;w01
Cnf(m;w)g        ! m0k; w; : : : ; w


g) truncate P =

m; : : : ;Truncate-Path

m;w01
Cnf(m;w)g        ! m0k; w; : : : ; w


h) let e be the first pair returned by the Truncate-Path
 If e is a match (i.e., e = (w;m))
{ if deleting match (w;m) does not introduce an augmenting cycle
i) delete match (w;m)
j) let e be the next pair after (w;m) in P
{ otherwise
k) run the above Steps (e,f,g,h)
(switching the notations of m and w (except m and w))
The subroutine tries to add and delete matches one by one along pairs in the
path P . If the current considered pair is a man-woman pair (i.e., e = (m;w)), the
subroutines matches them if it does not introduce any augmenting cycle. If the
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assignment of w is strictly improved (i.e., the condition in Step (3.b) or (3.c) is
satised), the subroutine terminates. Note that at this point the subroutine may
not completely eliminate the augmenting path, however, the overall assignment
of the woman gets strictly improved and the process restarts at the capacity
increment stage. If matching m and w will introduce a potential augmenting
cycle, instead of adding the match directly, the subroutine takes a \detour" and
considers the other path fromm to w along the cycle and expands it to the path P
(Step 3(f); by the following Lemma 4, it is a valid expansion). Then the subroutine
will do a truncation from m to the end of the path P and restarts the process
by considering the rst pair returned by the truncation (its rst individual must
be m). The subroutine performs similarly if the considered pair is a woman-man
pair.
We rst establish the following observations.
LEMMA 4: The expansion of path P in Step (3.f) is a well-dened augmenting
path.
PROOF:
Let P1 = [m
; w1;m1; : : : ; w0;m] and P2 = [w;m0; : : : ; w], where w0 is the
woman before m and m0 is the man after w in P . Then the original augmenting
path can be written as P = [P1;m;w; P2]. By the fact that P is an augmenting
path, we know that m weakly prefers w to w0 and w weakly prefers m to m0.
Let C 0 =
h
m01
Cnfm;wg      ! w0k
i
, then the extended path (denoted by P 0) is P 0 =
[P1;m;C
0; w; P2]. By the fact that C is an augmenting cycle if adding (m;w), we
know that m weakly prefers w01 to w and w weakly prefers m0k to m. Therefore,
m weakly prefers w01 to w0 and w weakly prefers m0k to m
0; this implies that the
expanded path P 0 is a well-dened augmenting path.
We have the following key claim, which implies that the subroutine always
terminates.
LEMMA 5: The subroutine Eliminate-Path(P ) terminates in nite number of
steps for any augmenting path P .
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D3. Proof of Lemma 5
In this section, we will prove the second subroutine Eliminate-Path always
terminates.
PROPOSITION 5: In the course of the subroutine Eliminate-Path(P ), for
each considered pair e in the augmenting path P , we can always reach a dierent
pair (i.e., redene e by Step (3.d), (3.h), or (3.j)) with dierent starting individ-
ual. That is,
 if e = (m;w), there is w0 such that the subroutine matches (m;w0) (not
introducing any augmenting cycle) and next moves to e = (w0; );
 if e = (w;m), there is m0 such that the subroutine deletes (w;m0) (not
introducing any augmenting cycle) and next moves to e = (m0; ).
PROOF:
We will only prove the claim for the case when e = (m;w); the same argument
extends for e = (w;m). Assume that adding (m;w1) , (m;w) introduces an
augmenting cycle C1 (otherwise, we are done); let w2 be the other woman incident
to m in C1. Note that m weakly prefers w2 to w1 and w2 weakly prefers m to her
assignment in C1. Next the subroutine expands path P with
h
m;w2
C1nf(m;w1)g         !
w1
i
, and consider adding (m;w2). Again assume that it introduces an augmenting
cycle C2; let w3 be the other woman incident to m in C2. We may continue
with this argument; if none of these matches can be added, then we get a loop
w1; w2; : : : ; wr; wr+1 = w1, where adding (m;wi) introduces an augmenting cycle
Ci containing (m;wi+1), for i = 1; : : : ; r. Note that m is indierent between all
w1; w2; : : : ; wr. Then consider the following big cycle
C =

w1
C1nf(m;w1);(m;w2)g               ! w2
C2nf(m;w2);(m;w3)g               ! w3   wr Crnf(m;wr);(m;w1)g               ! w1

Note that C is available before the subroutine arrives at edge (m;w) = (m;w1)
and it is possible that an edge appears more than once. For each wi, i =
2; : : : ; r + 1, let m0i 1 and mi be the other man (not m) incident to wi in cy-
cle Ci 1 and Ci, respectively. Notice that each wi weakly prefers m to m0i 1 and
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weakly prefers mi to m, i.e., wi weakly prefers mi to m
0
i 1. Further, if one of the
two preferences is strict, then wi strictly prefers mi to m
0
i 1. Therefore, C is an
augmenting cycle, a contradiction to the invariant that the algorithm will never
produce any augmenting cycle in the process. (Note that the fact that there is
an individual whose assignment can be strictly improved from C follows from the
fact of augmenting cycles of each C1; : : : ; Cr.)
We are now ready to prove the lemma.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5:
Note that if the condition in Step (3.b) or (3.c) is satised, i.e., the assignment of
a woman gets strictly improved, the subroutine returns and terminates. Hence, we
will assume without loss of generality that in the course of Eliminate-Path(P ),
all women involved are already fully-matched and are indierent between their
adjacent neighbors in path P .
Assume to the contrary that Eliminate-Path(P ) does not terminate. By
Proposition 5, we know that the subroutine will not get stuck at any specic node.
This implies that the subroutine will keep changing the statuses of pairs (i.e.,
either matched or unmatched) through Step (3.a) and (3.i). Since the assignments
of all women are kept at the same level, and the assignments of all men will not get
worse o (by the denition of augmenting path)18, we can divide the subroutine
into stages where it moves from one stage to another if there is a man whose
assignment get strictly improved. Since the subroutine does not terminate, it
eventually gets into the last stage where no man will be able to improve his
assignment. In other words, all individuals (men and women) are indierent
between their new assigned partner(s) and old partner(s) onwards.
Consider a moment when the subroutine is at the last stage, and let
P  = [x; y; : : : ; w]
be the current remaining augmenting path (i.e., after expansions and truncations
in previous stages), where e = (x; y) is the current considered pair (can be
18In the subroutine Eliminate-Path, we will do a sequence of reassignments, e.g., rst unmatch (w;m)
then match (m;w0). Precisely speaking, the assignment of m rst gets worse o then gets better o.
Here saying m does not get worse o or gets strictly better o, we mean the overall assignment of m by
combining these two consecutive reassignments.
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either (m;w) or (w;m)) and w is the last woman of the augmenting path. Since
it is guaranteed that the subroutine will never introduce any augmenting cycle,
at this moment there is no augmenting cycle. In the rest of the proof we will
restrict on the subroutine starting from this moment running on P .
For the initial augmenting path P , we set all pairs on it to be unmarked. In the
process of the subroutine when P  is updated, we mark/unmark pairs according
to the following rules:
1) If the status of (x; y) is changed (become matched or unmatched), mark
(x; y).
2) Recursively do the following: If a pair (x; y) is marked, mark all pairs in
 (y) (recall that  (y) is the truncated path at a specic occurrence of y in
the path P ).
3) If P  is expanded, unmark all expanded pairs.
Roughly speaking, the sign of a pair, marked or unmarked, denotes whether the
subroutine has reached that pair or not in the path P . In particular, if the
subroutine reaches to the last pair of P , all pairs have to be marked.
Let E denote a subset of pairs where (x; y) 2 E if in the process of running
Eliminate-Path, the subroutine cannot change the status of (x; y) because oth-
erwise it will bring a potential augmenting cycle. Note that (x; y) can be either
(m;w) or (w;m). Certainly E 6= ;. Let (x1; y1); (x2; y2); : : : ; (x`; y`) be the order
of pairs that are included into the subset E in the subroutine (note that jEj
is nite as the number of pairs is nite) and C1; C2; : : : ; C` be corresponding po-
tential augmenting cycles. Note that (xi; yi); (xi+1; yi+1) 2 Ci for i = 1; : : : ; `  1
(indeed, (xi+1; yi+1) is the reason that why the subroutine cannot move along
with
h
xi
Cinf(xi;yi)g         ! yi
i
to reach yi).
We have the following observations.
Claim 1. Consider any (x; y) 2 E and the moment when the subroutine is about
to change its status but cannot do so because of a potential augmenting cycle C.
Then x is indierent between its two neighbors in C and the other neighbor right
before it in P .
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Proof. We will only prove the claim for the case (x; y) = (m;w); the argument is
similar when (x; y) = (w;m). Let w1 be the woman before m in the augmenting
path P  and w2 be the other woman incident to m in C. By the denition of
augmenting path P  and augmenting cycle C, we know that m weakly prefers
w to w1 and w2 to w; hence m weakly prefers w2 to w1. If m strictly prefers
w2 to w1, then by the rule of Eliminate-Path, m is able to strictly improve
his assignment, which contracts to the assumption that we are at the last stage
where no one can improve his assignment anymore.
Claim 2. Consider any (x; y) 2 E and the moment when the subroutine is
about to change its status but cannot do so because of a potential augmenting
cycle C. Let y0 be an individual who is able to strictly improve its assignment
in C = [x; : : : ; x0; y0; x00; : : : ; y; x] (by the above claim, y0 6= x). By the rule of the
subroutine, we will expand the augmenting path to be
P  =
h
: : : ; x
Cnf(x;y)g       ! x0; y0; x00
Cnf(x;y)g       ! y; : : : ; w
i
and all pairs between x and y are unmarked. Then all pairs after (x0; y0) (inclusive)
in the current P  are always unmarked from this moment through the course of
the subroutine.
Proof. We will prove the claim for the rst pair (x1; y1) added into E
; the
proof for the rest of pairs can be done in a similar way by induction. Initially
all pairs in P  are unmarked. The subroutine follows pairs in P  one by one
| changes their status and makes them marked | until the point when we
get to (x1; y1). At this moment all pairs after (x1; y1 in P
 are still unmarked.
Then the subroutine expands P  according to the potential augmenting cycle
C1 = [x1; : : : ; x
0; y0; x00; : : : ; y1; x1] and unmarks all expanded pairs.
We will rst show that (x0; y0) is always unmarked. Since y is an individual
who is able to strictly improve its assignment, we cannot change the status of
(x0; y0) (i.e., get it marked) directly, because otherwise its assignment will be
strictly improved. Hence, the only way to mark (x0; y0) is through the second rule
above by marking all pairs in a truncated cycle  (z), where z is the node whose
truncation contains (x0; y0). By Proposition 3, we know that all individuals in
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 (z) are indierent between their two neighbors; this implies that (y0; x00) =2  (z).
Since (x0; y0) and (y0; x00) are consecutive pairs in P , the only way to separate
them is to truncate at y0, i.e., z = y0. By Proposition 4, however, after such
truncation, y0 still strictly prefers its one neighbor to the other, which implies
that it is still able to strictly improve its assignment, a contradiction.
Next consider any pair (x0; y0) after (x
0; y0) in P , i.e.,
P  = [: : : ; x0; y0; x00; : : : ; x0; y0; : : : ; w]
since (x0; y0) is always unmarked, again the only way to mark (x0; y0) is through
a truncated cycle. But that cycle has to include (x0; y0), which is impossible.
We consider the following walk according to pairs (x1; y1); (x2; y2); : : : ; (x`; y`)
in E: start from y1 following the direction of C1 n f(x1; y1)g until we get to y2;
next start from yi following the direction of Ci n f(xi; yi)g until we get to yi+1
for i = 2; : : : ; `  1; nally start from y` following the direction of C` n f(x`; y`)g
until we get to the rst yk, where (xk; yk) 2 E\C` (note that such (xk; yk) must
exist, otherwise, the subroutine can reach y`, which contradicts to the above
claim). Therefore, it forms a big cycle
C =

yk
Cknf(xk;yk)g         ! yk+1
Ck+1nf(xk+1;yk+1)g               ! yk+2 !    ! y` C`nf(x`;y`)g         ! yk

Note that by the above claim, all pairs in the walk are unmarked. Further, it can
be seen that C is an augmenting cycle, which contradicts to the fact that the
algorithm never introduces an augmenting cycle. This completes the proof of the
lemma.
D4. Analysis of the Algorithm
Again, the high level structure of the algorithm is to increase capacities of men
and eliminate augmenting paths. While the algorithm may look involved, as
the virtual capacity is not always monotonically increasing (e.g., in Step 6(c) of
Increase-Cap and Step 3(c) of Eliminate-Path, we actually need to reduce
the virtual capacities) and two subroutines may call each other, there is a simple,
but crucial, idea behind the algorithm: the assignments of women keep improving
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(this is the exact reason that we do not want to introduce any augmenting cycle
in the course of the algorithm). Therefore, at any moment of the algorithm,
if a woman's assignment gets improved (e.g., Step 6(c) of Increase-Cap and
Step 3(b), 3(c) of Eliminate-Path), the algorithm will abandon the current
subroutine and restart the whole process (i.e., capacity increment and augmenting
path elimination) starting from the current virtual capacity vector. Since every
woman can improve her assignment at most n2 times (as her capacity is at most
n and every unit capacity can be improved at most n times), the whole algorithm
will terminate.
It is easy to see that the three invariants listed at the beginning of the section are
maintained in the course of the algorithm. Indeed, the last two (no augmenting
cycle and women not worse o) hold trivially as they are guaranteed by the
algorithm itself. For stability, in the subroutine Increase-Cap, when increasing
the virtual capacity of m by one, we try to match m with a most preferred
woman w where (m;w) forms a blocking pair. If w is not over-matched, then the
resulting assignment is still stable. Otherwise, we delete a match (m0; w) where
m0 is a least preferred man matched to w and reduce the virtual capacity of m0
by one (Step (6.c) of Increase-Cap); this implies that the resulting assignment
is still stable with respect to the new capacity vector. For the second subroutine
Eliminate-Path, stability comes from the denition of augmenting path and
the fact that when we delete a match (w;m), we know that m must be a least
preferred man matched to w and w was over-matched (otherwise, when we add
the match right before (w;m), the assignment of w gets strictly improved and the
subroutine will run Step (3.b) or (3.c) to terminate). Therefore, the nal returned
assignment is stable.
When the algorithm Alg-Pareto-Stableterminates, by its rule there is no
augmenting path. By the invariant that there is no augmenting cycle, we know
that the returned assignment is Pareto-ecient. This yields the following result.
THEOREM 4: The algorithm Alg-Pareto-Stable computes a Pareto-stable
assignment in polynomial time.
